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EVIDENCE
By THOMAS F. GREEN, JR.*
One of the paradoxes of the law is presented by the large number of
decisions discussing evidence points' and the small number which allow
these points to affect the appellate court's judgment. A reversal solely on
the basis of erroneous admission or exclusion seldom occurs. Perhaps this
is as it should be. In this field the appellate courts lay down the principles
for the trial courts to follow but usually do not interfere with the trial
judge's application of those principles. Sometimes, however, the appellate
courts are too ready to reverse. In Henderson v. State' the charge was
murder and an expert on the identification of bullets was called by the
prosecution. He testified that he compared the bullet taken from the body
of the deceased with bullets fired from the pistol which was shown to
have belonged to the accused; that the comparison was made by examination under a comparision microscope; and that in his opinion the pistol in
evidence fired the bullet taken from the body. On cross-examination he
testified that although he used a certain instrument for measuring the
distance between the grooves he did not use the same instrument to
measure the distance across the top of a groove. When asked why not,
he answered, "I didn't do that because the comparison microscope is the
highest and best evidence." Defendant's counsel objected to the answer
as a conclusion. The trial judge said, "I overrule the objection because it
was in response to a question asked by the counsel." This was held to be
error and the conviction was reversed although the accused had been
identified by the eyewitness to the shooting. The court said that the answer
was not responsive to the question asked by defendant's counsel and was a
conclusion of law on a question that only the court could determine. Actually, it is probable that the witness was not entering the realm of law at all.
He formed his opinion from certain evidence persented to his eyes in
the laboratory. He was expressing his opinion as to what was the best
evidence in a laboratory from a scientific standpoint. He spoke of the.
microscope, something which was not offered in court. Therefore if his
words are taken literally they could not mean the best evidence in the
*Professor of Law, Lumpkin School of Law, University of Georoeia; A.B., 1925,
University of Georgia, LL.B., 1927; J.S.D., 1931 University of Chicago; MemberAmerican and Georgia Bar Associations.
1. The following cases decided during the period studied do not fall under any of the
headings in the text and do not seem worthy of any special notice: Sufficiency of
objection, Mims v. State, 207 Ga. 118, 60 S.E.2d 373 (1950) ; Reed v. White, 207
Ga. 623, 63 S.E.2d 597 (1951) ; Dunn v. State, 83 Ga. App. 682, 64 S.E.2d 478
(1951). Statement of evidence in ground for new trial, Hobbs v. Starr, .82 Ga. App.
441, 61 S.E.2d 435 (1950). Parol evidence, Turk v. Jeffryes McElrath Mfg. Co., 207

Ga. 73, 60 S.E.2d 166 (1950) ; Drury v. Drury, 207 Ga. 187, 60 S.E.2d 375 (1950) ;
Ledford v. Hill, 82 Ga. App. 299, 60 S.E.2d 555 (1950) ; Wilson v. Ingram, 207

Ga. 271, 61 S.E.2d 126 (1950) ; Clark v. Griffon, 207 Ga. 255, 61 S.E.2d 128 (1950) ;
Chelsea Corp. v. Steward, 82 Ga. App. 679, 62 S.E.2d 627 (1950) ; Pickens Investment Co. v. Jones, 82 Ga. App. 850, 62 S.E.2d 753 (1950) ; Millender v. Looper, 82

Ga. App. 563, 61 S.E.2d 573 (1950) ; Peters v. Peters, 84 Ga. App. 14, 65 S.E.2d.
439 (1951) ; Morgan v. Reeves, 84 Ga. App. 41, 65 S.E.2d 453 (1951).
2. 208 Ga. 73, 65 S.E.2d 175 (1951).
( 82)
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legal sense. Even if his words are interpreted to mean that what he saw
through the microscope was the highest evidence, the words still are just
as likely to refer to scientific evidence as to legal evidence. The witness
having qualified as an expert on bullets could give his opinion as to the
most scientific evidence for identification of bullets. Looked at in this
light the answer was entirely responsive to the question asked. If lounsel
thought the answer was not clear he should have asked further questions
such as why the microscopic evidence was better than measurement. The

reversal was the second by the Supreme Court in the same case within
twelve months and the second conviction did not rest upon ballistics
alone.
One way of avoiding a reversal is to invoke the doctrine of harmless
error. Thus the Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction of assault with
intent to murder although the trial court admitted a shotgun in evidence
without requiring it to be identified. The error was considered harmless
because accused admitted the shooting and claimed self-defense.' One of
the few cases reversed during the year on an erroneous admissibility ruling alone, could have been affirmed through a holding that the error was
harmless. On an issue of forgery the grantee, who was the grantor's wife,
testified that her husband signed the deed in her presence. On cross-examination she said that he later admitted having given her the property
and her possession of a deed to it. The trial court excluded this answer
given on cross-examination. The jury's verdict was to the effect that the
husband did not execute the deed.' The jury evidently did not believe the
wife, and the ultimate fact sought to be proved by the excluded admissions
is the same as the fact to which the rest of the wife's testimony was directed.
In view of these considerations might not the court have held quite properly
that the jury was most unlikely to reject the wife's statement that she
saw the grantor sign and yet accept her testimony that he admitted signing? So runs the argument for holding the error of exclusion to be harmless
in this instance. Arrayed on the other side and tending to support to some
extent the result reached by the court are the cases holding that the jury
may believe part only of a witness' testimony if they see fit.'
PRESUMPTIONS

One of the most difficult and least understood branches of the law
is made up of the rules relating to presumptions. Some of the cases decided
during the period under examination have involved routine applications of these rules;' others dealt with situations of more difficulty. One
3. Benton v. State, 83 Ga. App. 106, 62 S.E.2d 378 (1950). See also King v. State, 83
Ga. App. 175, 63 S.E.2d 292 (1951).
4. Georgia Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Marshall, 207 Ga. 314, 61 S.E.2d 469 (1950).
5. Cotton v. State. 81 Ga. App. 753, 59 S.E.2d 741 (1950) ; Stembridge v. State, 82 Ga.
App. 214, 60 S.E.2d 491 (1950).
6. McQuire v. State, 82 Ga. App. 132, 60 S.E.2d 526 (1950) (presumption that all
household effects including liquor belong to the head of the house held overcome by
evidence in this case) ; Belk v. Colleas, 207 Ga. 328, 61 S.E.2d 464 (1950) (judgment of insanity upon inquisition substitutes presumption of insanity for presumption of sanity) ; Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 82 Ga. App. 136, 60 S.E.2d 547 (1950)
(an unsuccessful attempt to have a person adjudicated a lunatic raises a presumption that he is not insane).
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of the latter cases concerns the distinction between presumptions and inferences. A presumption proper is a rule of law. An inference is simply
a process of reasoning based upon the experience of mankind. Each
results in a finding of fact B as a result of the proof of fact A. If there is
a presumptiqn, fact B is taken to be true upon proof of fact A unless and
until the presumption is rebutted. If an inference is relied on the question whether to infer B from the existence of A is for the jury to decide.
The law does not say that in every case the inference must be drawn.'
Another name for an inference is "presumption of fact."' The Code
provides that presumptions of fact are exclusively questions for the jury.'
In Beardsley v. Suburban Coach Co." the trial judge, after charging that
if party against whom a claim is made fails to produce evidence within
his power, a presumption of the claim being well founded arises but
may be rebutted, told the jury, ".

.

. if either party ... failed to produce

it, you may infer it would have been against the party so failing to produce
it, in the event you see fit to do so." The Court of Appeals said the judge
did not err. However, the instruction could have been held erroneous
because contradictory. The charge by using, in the first sentence, the
expressions "presumption arises" and "may be rebutted" treated the
matter as a presumption of law but in the second sentence treats the presumption as one of fact. If the appellate court believed that the second
sentence was controlling and that the charge was reasonably clear it was
perhaps justified in refusing to reverse." However, the subject is left in a
state of confusion because the Code seems to state a presumption of law 2
but the Beardsley opinion seems to treat it as one of fact or, more accurately, a mother of inference. Perhans the solution is to amend the Code
Section so that it will merely declare this inference to be permissible. 3
Several cases dealt with the presumption of negligence on the part of
a railroad which has been shown to have inflicted an injury by the running
of its locomotives. These decisions indicate that the present statutory presumption is rebutted and vanishes from the case when the railroad offers
opposing evidence as to each act of alleged negligence 4 and that the jury
should not then be charged concerning the presumption."
The presumption of due performance of legal conditions to official
action"6 was recognized by the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
7. Dyer v.State, 6 Ga.App.390, 65 S.E. 42 (1909).
8. Kinnebrew v. State, 80 Ga. 232, 5 S.E. 56 (1887).
9. GA. CODE § 38-113 (1933).
10. 83 Ga. App. 381, 63 S.E.2d 911 (1951).
11. Cotton States Fertilizer Co. v. Childs, 179 Ga. 23, 29, 174 S.E. 708, 711 (1934) says
that this proposition should be given in charge only in exceptional cases. See also
Brothers v. Horne, 140 Ga. 617 (3), 79 S.E. 468 (1913).
12. GA. CODE § 38-119 (1933). See Fountain v.Fuller E. Callaway Co., 144 Ga. 550
(2), 87 S.E. 651 (1916) ; Moye v. Reddick, 20 Ga. App. 649 (2), 93 S.E. 256
(1917) ; Blanchard v. Ogletree, 41 Ga. App. 4 (3), 152 S.E. 116, 118 (1929).
13. The importance of accurate language in the Code Section is shown by the fact
that in each of the cases in the preceding note the only charge given on the subject was the Code Section.
14. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Thomas, 83 Ga. App. 477, 64 S.E.2d 301 (1951). See
also Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Mercer, 82 Ga. App. 312, 60 S.E.2d 649 (1950) ;
Sherrill v. Callaway, 82 Ga. App. 499, 61 S.E.2d 548 (1950) ; Callison v. Savannah
& Atlanta Ry. Co., 82 Ga. App. 666, 62 S.E.2d 408 (1950).
15. Sylvania Ry. Co. v. Gay, 82 Ga. App. 486, 61 S.E.2d 587 (1950).
16. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2534 (3d ed. 1940).
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during the year 17 but an opinion by the same judge of the latter court in
another case failed to use the presumption and reached a very questionable
result. The action was for damages brought as the result of a collision
between an automobile which plaintiff was driving and a truck owned by
defendant. The latter proved that plaintiff did not stop before entering the
intersection. The collision occurred at the corner of the street in Cairo on
which plaintiff was proceeding and a state highway on which the truck was
traveling. Defendant offered to prove by the municipality's street superintendent that, acting on orders of the chairman of the Street Committee of Council, he placed a stop sign at the intersection in question.
The trial judge ruled out this testimony and all evidence as to the existence and location of the sign. He also refused to allow the truck driver
to testify that he expected the plaintiff to stop because of the sign. The
Court of Appeals upheld these rulings, saying that the plaintiff was not
required to stop unless the sign was authorized by municipal ordinance. 8
Two questions present themselves as to the soundness of this decision.
First, should not the defendant's evidence have been received as the basis
for a presumption that the sign installed by officials of the city was
regularly and legally installed? Second, even if the sign was not authorized
by ordinance should not the evidence have been admitted to throw light on
the care or negligence of the parties? An affirmative answer to the first
question is suggested by the fact that in many municipalities ordinances
are not printed or indexed and the only possibility of finding them is to
search through the minutes of council meetings for years past. Under
such circumstances failure to find an ordinance does not show its nonexistence. The practicalities of traffic control point in the same direction. It is
desirable to encourage motorists to respect stop signs. The decision under
discussion encourages drivers to take a chance by disobeying such signs.
The establishment of through streets and the marking of them with stop
signs on the cross streets are intended to keep traffic moving on the through
streets. The results of this decision, if drivers pay any attention to it, will
be to make motorists and "truckers" hesitate to continue through an
intersection when another vehicle is approaching a stop sign on the cross
street. We may add to these policy arguments the consideration that the
presumption of official regularity has been recognized by our Georgia
courts." So far as the lengthy report indicates, the use of the presumption
was not argued by counsel or considered by the court in the present case.
On the other hand the second question was presented by defendant's
counsel and answered in the negative by the court." Nevertheless an affirmative answer (i.e. that the evidence should have been admitted on this
theory) seems preferable here also. Questions of negligence are for the
jury except in the clearest cases. Yet the court rules that a person who
does not stop for a stop sign in an incorporated municipality is guilty of
negligence only if the sign is authorized by ordinance. This decision appears
17.

Telford v. Gainesville, 208 Ga. 56. 65 S.E.2d 246 (1951)
(legality of housing
authority agreement) : Wheeler v. Wheeler, 82 Ga. App. 831, 62 S.E.2d 579 (1950)
(performance of duty by ordinary).
18. Tyson v. Shoemaker, 83 Ga. App. 33, 62 S.E.2d 586 (1950).
19. Wheeler v. Wheeler, supra note 17; American Mortgage Co. of Scotland v. Hill,
92 Ga. 297, 18 S.E. 425 (1893) ; Hansen v. Owens, 132 Ga. 648, 64 S.E. 800 (1909).
:20. 83 Ga. App. at 49-50, 62 S.E.2d at 596-597.
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to invade the province of the jury.' A like question for the jury was presented by the problem of whether the truck driver was negligent because
he saw the plaintiff approaching and did not allow him to cross in safety.
The jury might find that the driver of the truck acted with due care in
assuming that plaintiff would stop for an official-appearing sign.22
JUDICIAL NOTICE

An interesting contrast is furnished by Gamble v. Gamble23 and Salter v.
Heys. 4 In the former the Supreme Court affirmed a judgment overruling
a demurre.r to a plea of res judicata. The error in the ruling was held
to be harmless because the Supreme Count took judicial notice of its
former decisions, two of which involved the same parties and land as the
pending proceeding, and knew thereby that the former adjudications did
preclude relief in the pending suit. In the Salter case a judgment sustaining defendant's plea of res judicata was reversed because the trial judge
sustained the plea without hearing any evidence. The Supreme Court
refused to take judicial notice of two decisions of the Court of Appeals
which defendant claimed would show that the judgment was correct as
they involve the former adjudication in question. The opinions of the Court
of Appeals are "published by authority" and the Supreme Court recognize
them just as readily as its own reports.25
The doctrine of judicial notice entered the case at another point also.
The judge of the superior court took cognizance of the record in the
former action in the same court and held, without receiving evidence,
that the matter had been adjudicated. Because of an earlier decision" exactly in point the Supreme Court felt bound to hold the judgment
erroneous. The case relied on as a precedent appears to be unsound. Judges
may judicially notice much which they cannot be required to notice. The
contents of the earlier record can be ascertained beyond question by an
examination of the record. If the trial judge is willing to make that examination without requiring formal proof, there is no reason why he should
not do so." The assignment of error in the Salter case and apparently also
in the earlier one was that the court had no power to decide without hearing evidence in support of the plea."0 The plaintiff did not ask to be allowed
to offer evidence against the plea and, so far as the report shows, did
not contend that there was any real dispute about the facts.
Other cases on judicial notice are cited in the footnote."
21. Plaintiff's testimony that he did not see the sign should be weighed against all the
circumstances of the case. If the excluded testimony had been admitted the jury
might have been persuaded by it to disbelieve the plaintiff.
22. The Court of Appeals puts great emphasis upon a statute interpreted as givingplaintiff the right of way but the effect given to the presence of the sign would
determine whether the truck driver violated the statute.
23. 207 Ga. 380, 61 S.E.2d 836 (1950).
24. 207 Ga. 591, 63 S.E.2d 376 (1951).
25. GA. CODE§ 38-112 (1933).
26. Glaze v. Bogle, 105 Ga. 295, 31 S.E. 169 (1898).
27. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2583 (3d ed. 1940).
28. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2579 (3d ed. 1940).
29. 207 Ga. at 595, 63 S.E.2d at 379.
30. Judicial notice of fact that old people have had memories, Leventhal v. Baumgartner, 207 Ga. 412, 61 S.E.2d 810 (1950). Day of the week, Ellis v. Stokes, 207
Ga. 423, 61 S.E.2d 806 (1950). County population in census, Rhyne v. Price, 82
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WITNESSES

On the topic of competency of witnesses the most peculiar thing in
Georgia law is the incompetency of the accused in a criminal case. 3 He
cannot become technically a witness even when he wishes to do so. This is
the only state retaining this relic of common law barbarism. It is an
anachronism in the twentieth century when parties to civil cases and interested persons, with a few exceptions, may all testify. There is reason
to believe that the innocent defendant is handicapped by being denied the
privilege of putting in his own testimony under oath whereas the guilty
one is allowed to avoid perjury penalties and to escape cross-examination.
The subject is brought to mind by a case in which defendant's counsel
offered to permit the solicitor general to cross-examine the defendant. 2
The judge told the defendant to leave the stand and return to his seat
in the courtroom. After defendant's counsel moved for a mistrial, the
solicitor said that the defendant was not under oath and he had no desire
to place him under oath. On appeal the Supreme Court pointed out
that while the accused cannot be placed under oath he may consent to be
cross-examined. The court apparently interpreted the solicitor's declaration as declining to question him and held there was no error in denying
the motion for mistrial or in the judge's remarks. "
In a case in which the rule making a wife incompetent to testify against
her husband in a criminal case was invoked by the accused in an effort to
show error, it was properly held that the rule was not violated by permitting the wife of the accused to be brought into the courtroom in the
presence of the jury for the purpose of having her identified by a witness."4
An eight year old girl was held to be a competent witness by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals. She testified that she did not know what she
was doing when sworn as a witness and did not know what would happen
to her if she told a story but that she knew it was wrong to tell a story.
The trial judge noted that she was intelligent and above average in
school work as shown by report cards. 5 In deciding that there was no
abuse of discretion in allowing the little girl to testify to an assault upon her
the court reached a result inconsistent with Code Section 38-1607 as interpreted by earlier cases in the same court. One of the earlier opinions said:
In this case tle law declared the child was incompetent as a witness to

testify against the accused unless she was shown by the preliminary examination to
know the nature of an oath. Her examination on this subject shows beyond
question that she had no knowledge whatever on the subject. On the prelimi-

Ga. App. 691, 62 S.E.2d 420 (1950). Federal statute, Parker v. Parker, 207 Ga. 588,
63 S.E.2d 366 (1951). Public officers of state, Delinski v, Dunn, 207 Ga. 723, 64
S.E.2d 44 (1951). Rate of decay, Bainbridge v. Cox, 83 Ga. App. 453, 64 S.E.2d

192 (1951). Result of election under local option law, Ivey v. State, 84 Ga. App.

72, 65 S.E.2d 282 (1951). Refusal to take judicial notice of administrative regulation, Columbus Wine Co. v. Sheffield, 83 Ga. App. 593, 64 S.E.2d 356 (1951).
31. See GA. CODE § 38-415 (1933).
32. Porch v. State, 207 Ga. 645. 63 S.E.2d 902 (1951).

33. Another case dealing with defendant's statement held that the evaluation of the
statement was for the jury, not the Supreme Court. Boyd v. State, 207 Ga. 567,
63 S.E.2d 394 (1951).
34. Mims v. State, 207 Ga. 118, 60 S.E.2d 373 (1950).

35. Russell v. State, 83 Ga. App. 841, 65 S.E.2d 264 (1951), citing Moore v. State, 79,
Ga. 498, 5 S.E. 51 (1887), and other cases.
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nary examination she testified that she knew the difference between the truth
and a lie, and that it was wrong to tell a lie; but this is not the test which the
law makes as to the competency of witnesses. 36

The same opinion said of the Code requirement that the child understand the nature of an oath ".

.

. it is a positive declaration of the statute

and cannot be disobeyed." On the other hand the more recent decisions
seem to take awareness of the obligation to tell the truth as equivalent to
understanding the nature of an oath," and thus support the result in the
case under discussion. The result appears sensible from a practical viewpoint, although not technically correct under the, language of the statute."
The Code Section should be amended.
One change in the law in this general field was made during the year
by statute. Code Section 38-I6O6, which has the effect of making parties
to actions instituted in consequence of adultery, their husbands, wives,, and
certain other persons, incompetent witnesses, was amended by adding the
following:
Provided, however, that this section shall not prevent a party charged with
adultery from being competent to testify as ,to his or her innocence of such
charge. 9

Is this proviso limitedto the plaintiff and defendant? The title of the
amendatory act says "no person charged with adultery shall be incompetent."
Another statute deals with communications made by any person professing religious faith or seeking spiritual guidance or comfort, to any
Christian minister or priest or Jewish rabbi by whatever title called. 0
Here again there is a possible contradiction of the title of the act by the
body. The former speaks of the communications as privileged; the body
of the act says that no such minister, priest, or rabbi shall disclose, or be
competent or compellable to testify with reference to, any such communication in any court. The difference in language is important because the
person having a privilege, presumably it would be the communicant under
this statute, can waive it and the communication can then be disclosed in
testimony if otherwise admissible. On the other hand if the minister is
an incompetent witness on this subject, the incapacity can be waived, if
at all, only by'the party to the case against whom the evidence is offered.
36. Warthen v. State, 11 Ga. App. 151, 74 S.E. 894 (1912). See also Horton v. State,
35 Ga. App. 493, 133 S.E. 647 (1926).
37. Gordon v. State, 186 Ga. 615, 198 S.E. 678 (1938). Cf. Young v. State, 72 Ga. App.
811, 35 S.E.2d 321 (1945).
38. The youthful witness said it was wrong to tell an untruth but did not connect
the obligation to tell the truth with the oath in any way.
39. Ga. Laws 1951, pp. 596-597. "
40. Ga. Laws 1951, p. 468. Cases definitely dealing with privilege: Hunter v. State, 81
Ga. App. 797, 60 S.E.2d 187 (1950) ; Carr v. State, 83 Ga. App. 678, 64 S.E.2d 190
(1951). Both involve the privilege against self-incrimination and also illegally
obtained evidence. The latter point is also found in Notis v. State, 84 Ga. App.
199, 65 S.E.2d 622 (1951).
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The cases examined, other than those already discussed, dealt with
credibility and impeachment,41 and extent of cross-examination. 2
ADMISSIBILITY

State43

Potter v.
announced again the Georgia rule that if evidence is
of doubtful admissibility, the court should admit it. This doctrine is one
of the better features of our law." It simply expresses a liberal attitude
toward the rules of evidence. There will be occasions when the trial
judge can apply the rules of admissibility with no feeling of uncertainty
and he should not shun his duty on such occasions. In other instances he
may be justified in feeling a doubt. He may be confronted with difficult
questions of fact. Was a dying declarant conscious of his condition? Does
child offered as witness understand the nature of an oath? The doctrine,
"when in doubt, admit the evidence," places the burden of proof on the
party objecting and enables the judge to decide even when the evidence for
and against admissibility or competency appears to him equally persuasive.
The doctrine will also be useful when the judge finds himself unable to
choose between conflicting policies bearing on a close question. In applying
the law of evidence attention should be given to the underlying reasons
so that the precepts are not used as inflexible rules of thumb. If the
objection is made that a given piece of evidence is unduly prejudicial the
court must decide whether its probative value outweights the chances of
prejudice or whether the contrary is true. Not being a Solomon the average
judge may not be able to decide which is the weightier aspect of the
evidence in some instances. To say, "when in doubt, exclude," would be
to attach an unreasonable importance to the law of evidence. The rules
are man-made and to a considerable extent deal with procedure rather
than substance.45 Some of them in their present form are of dubious soundness. 6 If they are to be enforced, let us at least not apply them with overstrictness.
RELEVANCY

Many of the cases which might be dealt with under this heading really
turn upon questions of substantive law which determines what is pertinent
to the issues. Therefore only selected decisions will be discussed here. In
Garner v. State" it is said that no precise and universal test of the
relevancy of testimony is furnished by the law but each must be determined
in accordance with the facts of that particular case; that when the facts
41. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Heyward, 82 Ga. App. 337, 60 S.E.2d 641 (1950);
Daniel v. State, 82 Ga. App. 535, 61 S.E.2d 561 (1950) ; Waters v. State. 82 Ga.
App. 608, 61 S.E.2d 794 (1950); Peeler v. State. 83 Ga. App. 102. 62 S.E.2d 750
(1950) ; Mayo v. McClung. 83 Ga. App. 548, 64 S..E.2d 330 (1951) ; Taylor v. State,
83 Ga. App. 735, 64 S.E.2d 598 (1951); Champion v. State, 84 Ga. App. 163, 65
S.E.2d 280 (1951).
42. Russell v. Bass, 82 Ga. Apo. 659, 62 S.E.2d 456 (1950); Walden v. State. 83 Ga.
App. 231, 63 S.E.2d 232 (1951) ; Williams v. State, 83 Ga. App. 252, 63 S.E.2d
442 (1951).
43. 83 Ga. App. 713, 64 S.E.2d 630 (1951).
44. For a different view, consult Spark, Evidence, 2 MERCER L. REV. 88, 93 (1950).
45. For a fuller discussion see Green, To What Extent May Courts under the RuleMaking Power PrescribeRules of Evidence, 26 A.B.A. J. 482 (1940).
46. See for a few examples. 1 WICMORE. EVIDENCE 273, 278, 281 (3rd ed. 1940).
47. 83 Ga. App. 178, 63 S.E.2d 225 (1951).
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are such that the jury logically may or may not make a pertinent inference
from them in connection with the other facts in evidence they ought to be
permitted to hear them; that every circumstance serving to throw light upon
a material issue or issues is relevant. The Court of Appeals held properly
admitted in a prosecution for assault with intent to rape, evidence that an
unidentified woman in an unidentified car was heard to scream and cry in
or near locations where the prosecutrix had testified that she screamed
for help. The testimony was not considered too remote and was held to
be admissible as tending to corroborate the prosecutrix.
In Caldwell v. State4" a ruling was affirmed which admitted testimony
concerning the trail bloodhounds had followed from a "moonshine" still,
although no foundation had been laid as to the pedigree or training of the
dogs. The court seemed to recognize that the ruling would ordinarily be
erroneous in the absence of the foundation. It was held not to be reversible
error because the objecting defendant had previously on cross-examination
asked about the conduct of the same dogs. The opinion says that the State
could, under the circumstances, examine its witness further on redirect to
explain and neutralize what defendant had brought out on cross-examination with regard to the same subject. The question arises whether this
decision is in conflict with a line of cases in Georgia which hold that receiving inadmissible evidence does not justify the opponent in rebutting by
other inadmissible facts.4"
Another case" stressed the discretion vested in the trial judge and refused to disapprove the admission of testimony about other people walking
on the same portion of the waxed floor on which plaintiff fell and about
nothing being done to the floor after plaintiff fell and no one falling. The
dissenting judge calls attention to the rule prohibiting plaintiff from showing that something had been done after the accident to make the floor
safer and suggests that the same reasoning applies to the converse of the
proposition.
Other cases relate to the relevancy or irrelevancy of a state of mind5
before and after the transaction when the issue is mental competency; 1
insurance ;53 of evidence
of commission of other acts and crimes ;,52 of liability
5
in automobile collision suits;,4 of character ; of undated memorandum;"
of evidence contradicting solemn judicial admission made by proponent; 7
and of expense of prosecution. 8
48. P2 Ga. App. 480. 61 S.E.2d 543 (1950).
49. Byfi-ld -. Candler. 160 Ga. 732. 129 S.E. 57 (1925): Stapleton v. Monroe, 111 Ga.
Rd8. 36 S.E. 429; (1.900): Woolfolk v.'State. 81 Ga. 552.8 .E. 724 (1887).
50. Ho - v. First Nat. Bank of West Point, 82 Ga. 861. 62 S.E.2d 634 (1950).
51. Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 82 Ga. Ann. 136. 60 S.E.2d 547 (1950).
52. Mims v. State, 207 Ga. 118, 60 S.E.2d 373 (1950) ; Fowler v. State, 82 Ga. App. 197,
60 S.E.2d 473 (1950) ; Scarboro v. State. 82 Ga. Apn. 273, 60 S.E.2d 658 (1950) ;
Waters v. State. 82 Ga. App. 608. 61 S.E.2d 794 (1950); Mixon v. State. 83 Ga.
App. 167. 63 S.E.2d 294 (1951). Cf. Lampkin v. State, 83 Ga. App. 831, 65 S.E.2d
184 (1951).
53. Wood v. Venable. 83 Ga. Apn. 498, 64 S.E.2d 387 (1951).
54. Hawkins v. Benton Rapid Express, Inc.. 82 Ga. App. 819. 62 S.E.2d 612 (1950)
Tyson v. Shoemaker, 83 Ga. App. 33. 62 S.E.2d 586 (1950), see note 18 supra;
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Mathis. 83 Ga. Ann. 415, 63 S.E.2d 921 (1951).
55. Osteen v. State, 83 Ga. App. 378, 63 S.E.2d 692 (1951) ; see also note 52 supra.
56. Walker v. State, 81 Ga. Anp. 741, 59 S.E.2d 766 (1950).
57. Pruitt v. Satterfield, 207 Ga. 25. 59 S.E.2d 907 (1950).
58. Campbell v. State, 81 Ga. App. 834, 60 S.E.2d 169 (1950).
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HEARSAY

As was to be expected there were, during the period studied, decisions
excluding ordinary hearsay 59 and others admitting evidence which fell within well-known exceptions to the rule against hearsay."° In still others
the testimony to which objection was made was held not to be hearsay.
Williams v. American Surety Co. 1 gives the following definition: "Hearsay evidence is that which rests upon the truth and veracity of other persons not subject to cross-examination on the trial." This is a paraphrase of
Code Section 38-301. The action was to recover the amount of two checks
paid to defendant by mistake after the drawee bank had been notified not
to cash checks drawn on a certain account and signed by him. Objection
had been made to testimony by an assistant vice-president of the bank
that he told his secretary to tell the bookkeepers not to honor any more
checks signed by the defendant. This evidence seems to have been offered
to show due diligence by the official of the bank. The objection was overruled and the ruling approved on appeal. The result is certainly correct.
The words of the official would not be hearsay even if presented by some
other witness who heard them, because they do not purport to state a
preexisting fact and therefore the speaker's veracity would not be involved.
The value of the evidence would be derived solely from the veracity of the
witness. In this respect the case is like another decided during the period.
Williams v. Harris2 holds a description in deeds admissible against hearsay objection when the deeds are offered to prove boundaries of land conveyed. The value of the evidence does not depend upon the truthfulness of
the person who wrote the description. The evidence in the two Williams
cases was offered for a purpose which is the same in principle as the object of the testimony which was properly received in King v. State.63 A
witness in this criminal proceeding was allowed to testify, in order to explain his conduct, that the cashier of a corporation for which witness was
manager reported a discrepancy in money entrusted to defendant. Here
the cashier's extra-judicial declaration does state a fact, the shortage, but
the quotation (by the manager on the stand) of the statement is not
offered to prove the shortage but only to explain why the manager went
in search of the defendant. The manager's testimony was held not to be
hearsay on the authority of Code Section 38-302.
The interesting thing about Williams v. American Surety Co., supra,
the check case, is the reasoning used to reach the result. The admissibility
of the testimony was placed not upon the nature of the purpose for which
the jury was to use it but upon the identity between witness and declarant.
If this means that testimony quoting what the witness himself said on an59. Robinson v. State. 207 Ga. 337, 61 S.E.2d 475 (1950) ; Paris v. Paris, 207 Ga. 341,
61 S.E.2d 491 (1950).
60. Stembridge v. State. 82 Ga. Amp. 214. 60 S.E.2d 491 (1950) (dying declaration)
Brown v. State. 83 Ga. App. 650, 64 S.E.2d 313 (1951) (same); Ledford v. Hill,
82 Ga. App. 299, 60 S.E.2d 555 (1950) (tradition as to boundaries); Sconyers v.
Pierce, 82 Ga. App. 436. 61 S.E.2d 439 (1950) (ouestionable suggestion that market
value exception applied) ; Bell v. Washam, 82 Ga. App. 63, 60 S.E.2d 408 (1950)
(res gestae).

61. 83 Ga. App. 66, 62 S.E.2d 673 (1950).
62. 207 Ga. 576, 63 S.E.2d 386 (1951).
.63. 83 Ga. App. 175, 63 S.E.2d 292 (1951).
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other occasion is never hearsay, it seems to conflict with a decision rendered
two and a half months later by the Supreme Court. In an action to enjoin
a trespass one of the issues was the location of the boundary between plaintiff's and defendants' land. The trial judge, over objection, allowed defendants to testify to conversations between them and plaintiff's husband and
sons concerning the boundary. There was no evidence that the husband or
sons were authorized to represent the plaintiff as agents in the matter of
the boundary. The Supreme Court decided that the testimony by the defendants was hearsay and self-serving." Since the testimony included
quotations from the witnesses' own declarations, the classifying of the
evidence as hearsay appears to be based upon the absence of an opportunity to cross-examine at the time the declarations were made. The
same basis existed in the American Surety case but as stated above other
tests justified the conclusion that the evidence in that case was not hearsay. However the Court of Appeals decided the point by saying, in effect,
when a witness quotes himself, his testimony is not hearsay. A logical result of this line of reasoning would be to hold that if a witness admits
making a prior statement inconsistent with his testimony, the previous
contradictory statement will be evidence of the fact stated even though the
witness testifies the fact is not true. On the other hand it is well settled
that where a witness denies making a previous contradictory statement but
other witnessess testify that he did make the statement, and the
jury, believes the other witnesses, the statement will not serve as evidence
of the fact stated but only as impeaching material.
In a workmen's compensation proceeding the claimant was allowed to
testify that her deceased husband, upon coming home from work the
day before his death, complained a great deal and apparently had chest
pains. The Court of Appeals held this evidence admissible because declarations to whomsoever made are competent evidence when confined
strictly to such complaints, expressions, and exclamations as furnish evidence of present existing pain of the declarant."6 The rule stated is a
sensible one but needs to be reconciled with earlier decisions. The Supreme
Court held inadmissible testimony by a wife that her husband complained
of his side a great deal.6 A later case decided a ruling to be erroneous which
permitted a physician to testify that the olaintiff seeking treatment complained of backache and pains in her hips."5 These cases are not mentioned
in the opinion under discussion nor are two similar ones which were decided
by the Court of Appeals.6" In each of the four earlier cases the plaintiff
was the person who made the declaration of pain. In the I9O workmen's
comoensation decision the declarant was dead and the olaintiff was his wife
seeking compensation for his death. May we assume then that declarations:
64. Watts v. Pettigrew, 207 Ga.654, 63 S.E.2d 897 (1951).

65. Central Railroad & Bankinz Co. v. Maltsbv, 90 Ga. 630, 16 S.E. 953 (1892) ; Watts
v. Starr. 86 Ga. 392, 12S.E. 585 (1890) ; Luke v. Cannon, 4 Ga. App. 538, 62 S.E.
110 (1908).
66. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Meeks, 81 Ga. App. 800. 60 S.E.2d 258 (1950).
67. Atlanta Street Ry. Co. v. Walker,93 Ga. 462. 21 S.E. 48 (1895).
68. Atlanta K. & N. Ry. Co. v. Gardner, 122 Ga. 82. 49 S.E. 818 (1905).
69. Wade v. Drinkard, 76 Ga. App. 159, 45 S.E.2d 231 (1947) ; Alabama & Great Sou..
Ry. Co. v. McBryar, 65 Ga. App. 153, 15 S.E.2d 563 (1941).
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of present pain are admissible when the declarant is dead? When he or
she is otherwise unavailable?
This same 195o decision allowed the son of the deceased to testify
that his father, while changing clothes immediately after work, complained of pain in his chest and said the work was too heavy, he would
have to quit. The statements were considered a part of the res gestae.
The same doctrine was used to uphold the admission of a declaration
relevant for the purpose of showing declarant's knowledge.7
Goodwin v. Allen" was a decision on appeal in an action against police
officers for false arrest. Plaintiff had been tried and acquitted of the charge
on which she was arrested. A witness who testified at the hearing on the
charge was claimed to be "beyond the limits of the State and inaccessible"
at the time of the trial of the action for damages. Nevertheless the trial
judge would not receive evidence of the testimony of the absent witness
given in the other proceeding. The plaintiff's assignment of error on this
ruling was sustained. Three questions are presented as to the soundness
of the holding: Do the issues, the parties, and the showing of inaccessibility
satisfy the requirements of the Code? 72 The opinion of the court says:
. .. Such testimony was given on a former trial of the case, under oath, where
the issue was exactly the same as on this trial, namely the guilt or innocence
of the plaintiff of the charges brought against her by the defendant arresting
officers. .. 73

The issue on the former trial is correctly described but the issue in
the action for damages is the commission by the plaintiff of the acts
charged, in the presence of the defendants. Therefore the issues were not
exactly the same, and the question is, were they substantially the same? The
court failed to consider the real problem because it found the issues to be
identical. On the second question the court failed to expressly notice that.
the defendants were not parties to the proceeding in which the charges
against the plaintiff were heard. However, the opinion stresses the active
prosecution of the plaintiff by the defendants and the cross-examination by
them of the witness in question." The court is to be commended for its
liberal attitude on this point. The requirement concerning the parties has
as its purpose protection of the party against whom the evidence is offered
from testimony which from his standpoint has not been adequately crossexamined. It seems reasonable to hold the opportunity to cross-examine
adequate when it was extended to the same persons now objecting to the
reported testimony.
As to inaccessibility of the witness the only showing before the appellate
court, so far as the report indicates, was the averment in plaintiff's motion
for a new trial that it was shown to the trial court that "the witness was
beyond the limits of the State and inaccessible." The trial court certified
to the truth of the averments of fact in the motion. There is considerable
authority in this state recognizing the discretion of the trial judge in
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Brown v. Sheridan, 83 Ga. App. 725. 64 S.E.2d 636 (1951).
83 Ga. Apo. 615, 64 S.E.2d 212 (1951).
GA. CODE § 38-314 (1933).
83 Ga. App. at 616, 64 S.E.2d at 214.
This is explained, no doubt, by the fact that the hearing was in the Recorder's
Court of the City of Atlanta.
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determining whether the witness is inaccessible within the meaning of Code
Section 38-3 I4."' If the upper court recognizes this discretion in the present
instance it has held the judge guilty of an abuse of discretion without
knowing on what evidence he acted. According to this decision then the
judge must hold the witness to be inaccessible if he finds him to be beyond
the limits of the state. The dictum cited in the opinion lends some support
to the conclusion." On the other hand a case earlier in time than the
authority cited says that "whether or not a witness beyond the jurisdiction
of this state is inaccessible in the sense in which that word is used" in the
predecessor of Code Section 38-314 "is in each particular case, a question
for determination by the trial judge, in the exercise of a sound discretion."
ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS

The so-called definitions in Code Section 3 8-4 oi-"Admissions usually
refer to civil cases; confession to criminal"-are only half true. The
term confession has no technical significance in the law of evidence for
civil cases, but "admissions" may refer just as well to criminal as to
civil cases. The latter proposition is illustrated by Harris v. State"8 and
Brown v. State7 which recognize that admissions of incriminating facts
may be received in evidence in criminal prosecutions even though they do
not amount to confessions. However in each of the two cases it was held
that the words of the accused amounted to an admission of guilt of crime
and therefore charging the jury on confessions was authorized. In another
case the admission of testimony concerning what defendant said he sold
his peanuts for was justified by the court on the ground of admissions and
also as coming within the hearsay exception for declarations about market
value.8" The reference to market value as an exception was not necessary
since the statement was an admission. The hearsay rule never excludes
evidence of what a party to the suit has said when offered by the opposite
party. Another decision reversed a judgment because the trial court
failed 81to recognize an admission and excluded the witness' quotation of the
party.
OPINIONS OR CONCLUSIONS

The Georgia rule that a nonexpert witness may, after stating the
factual basis, give his opinion upon a matter which would have been a
proper subject for opinion testimony by an expert, was applied in Sellers v.
Johnson." The stumps and laps remaining after certain trees had been
Sheppard v. State, 167 Ga. 326, 145 S.E. 654 (1928) ; Brooks v. State, 69 Ga. App.
697 (4), 26 S.E.2d 549, 550 (1943), and cases cited.
76. Estill v. Citizens & Southern Bank, 153 Ga. 618, 623, 113 S.E. 552. 555 (1922).

75.

77. Atlanta & Charlotte Airline Ry. Co. v. Gravitt, 93 Ga. 369, 28 S.E. 550 (1894).
78. 207 Ga. 287, 61 S.E.2d 135 (1950). As to corroboration of confessions see cases
under heading Sufficiency of Evidence, infra.
79. 83 Ga. App. 650, 64 S.E.2d 313 (1951). See also Kersey v. State, 207 Ga. 326, 61
S.E.2d 493 (1950).
80. Sconyers v. Pierce, 82 Ga. App. 436, 61 S.E.2d 439 (1950).
81. Georgia Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Marshall, 207 Ga. 314, 61 S.E.2d 469 (1950).
The reversal is questioned at the beginning of this article; see note 4 supra. Another case approves the allowing in evidence of withdrawn pleading containing
admissions. Hertz. etc., Inc. v. Benson, 83 Ga. App. 866, 65 S.E.2d 191 (1951).
82. 207 Ga. 166, 60 S.E.2d 352 (1950).
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cut were measured and the witness, having testified to the measurements,
was allowed to give his estimate of the amount of lumber the trees would
produce. He said on the stand that he was not an expert in measuring
lumber or trees. Held, no error. The doctrine followed in this case is
well established by Georgia precedents but appears to be peculiar to this
state. The treatment may be due to the language of the Code.83 Sound
law would provide two types of exceptions to the general rule that opinion
is riot admissible. One type consists of opinions of nonexperts based on
facts which it would be impossible to convey adequately to the jury.8" The
second type consists of opinions of experts as to matters which require
special training or experience for a proper understanding of them.8" The
reason for receiving the opinion of the expert is that he has the necessary
training and experience to bring to the aid of the jury. The nonexpert does
not. From the foregoing it can be seen that the Georgia doctrine in question blurs the distinction between expert and other opinion and ignores
the usual reasons for receiving the evidence.8"
A number of other cases held evidence admissible as against the objection
of violating the opinion rule8" and still others held certain evidence inadmissible. 8 Three passed upon the propriety of the hypothetical questions
asked.8" Two others stated the proposition that the jury is not bound to
accept a witness' opinion." Garner v. State1 involved the question, "Did
it sound like somebody hollering for any particular purpose?" and the
answer, "It sounded like somebody was in trouble." The admission of this
testimony was approved, the court saying that obviously the question called
for the opinion of the witness and the answer gave it; that sufficient facts
were stated in the other answers of the witness to serve as a basis for the
conclusion of the witness. The reasoning is not clear. Certainly the Code
does not mean that counsel can get an opinion on just any relevant subject
admitted merely by asking for it. The court here as in many of the recent
decisions involving the opinion rule does not explain what is meant by a
matter of opinion. Both Garner v. State and Sellers v. Johnson, supra,
might be interpreted as using a doctrine similar to the pleading principle
that a conclusion may be stated if the facts on which it is based are first
83.
84.
85.
86.

87.

88.
89.
90.
91.

GA. CODE § 38-1708 (1933).
7 WIGMORE. EVIDENCE § 1924 (3d ed. 1940).
Id. § 1923 (3d ed. 1940).
See id. § 1918, p. 11: "In some instances, one witness may be able to give re.I help
to the tribunal, while another may not-as where we should list2n tn the estimate
of a certain bullet's calibre by a gunmaker, but not to that of the ordinary witness
who found it and produces it."
Fowler v. State, 82 Ga. App. 197, 60 S.E.2d 473 (1950) Railway Express A, ncy,
Inc. v. Mathis. 83 Ga. App. 415, 63 S.E.2d 921 (1951) Johnson v. State. P2 Ga.
App. 840. 62 S.E.2d 837 (1950); Spence v. State, 83 Ga. App. 588. 63 S.E.2r 910
(1951) ; Royal Crown Bottling Co. v. Stiles, 82 Ga. App. 254. 60 S.E.2d 815 (19.50).
And see Gladney v. State, 82 Ga. App. 397, 61 S.E.2d 287 (1950).
Langford v. Edmondson. 82 Ga. App. 494. 61 S.E.2d 558 (1950); Mullinax v.
Turner, 83 Ga. App. 1, 62 S.E.2d 398 (1950); Bryson v. Lee, P2 Ga. App. 689, 62
S.E.2d 405 (1950) ; Henderson v. State, 208 Ga. 73, 5 S.E.2d 175 (1951).
Adler v. Adler, 207 Ga. 394, 61 S.E.2d 824 (1950) ; Clay v. State. 83 Ga. App. 719,
64 S.E.2d 898 (1951); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meeks, 81 Ga. App. 800, 60 S.E.2d
258 (1950).
Boyd v. State, 207 Ga. 567, 63 S.E.2d 394 (1951) ; Watson v. Tompkins Chevrolet
Co.. 83 Ga. App. 440.63 S.E.2d 681 (1951).
83 Ga. App. 178, 63 S.E.2d 225 (1951).
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given. However, both opinions cite Code Section 38-1708 which concludes,
"but if the issue shall be as to the existence of a fact, the opinions of
witnesses, generally, shall be inadmissible." The tests of admissibility for
lay opinion in Georgia would seem to be: first, is the subject of the question a matter of opinion because the underlying facts cannot be described
to the jury to such an extent that the jury can see the situation as the witness
did? 2 If the foregoing reason does not apply, then is it a matter of opinion
because an expert could have given his opinion? 3 A careful application of
these tests and a clear statement of them in the opinions would make the
decisions more consistent and intelligible.
REAL EVIDENCE

Common sense should teach us that the court cannot receive objects
offered in evidence unless they are shown to be what they are offered
as being. Yet lawyers and judges sometimes forget this. In Burgess v. Simmons,9 4 a proceeding to register title to land, the applicant's counsel offered
in evidence a letter for the purpose of proving a contract concerning the
land. The applicant testified that after his father's death he obtained the
letter, which was addressed to his father, from a lawyer who had represented his father. There being no evidence of the authenticity of the letter,.
which purported to be from G. L. Small, the examiner excluded it. On
exceptions to the examiner's report the superior court reversed the ruling
but was in turn reversed by the Supreme Court. Since no effort was made
to prove the execution or genuineness of the letter, there was no error
in excluding it.
The method of authenticating a certified copy of a record of the United
States Government is illustrated by Pressley v. State. 5 A copy of the
dental chart of the victim of the alleged murder was offered by the prosecution. The defense made a number of objections directed to the sufficiency of the authentication. The objections were not such as to require the
court to pass upon each step in the process of proof but perhaps an outline of the necessary steps would be of interest. For the chart to be
relevant it must be proven to be one relating to the deceased. A certificate
by the Chief of the Naval Bureau of Medicine and Surgery was relied
on for this purpose. Since the makers were not available for cross-examination by counsel for the accused the certificate and chart were hearsay
and to be admissible must fall within one of the exceptions to the rule
excluding hearsay. Because of the nature of the office it can perhaps be
said that the bureau has the duty of keeping records of medical and dental
information about the personnel of the Navy. The signer certifies that
"the annexed" is a true copy and that he is the custodian of the records.
This qualifies the chart and certificate under the official statement or public
92. Harris v. State, 188 Ga. 745, 4 S.E.2d 651 (1939); Barron v. Chamblee, 199 Ga. 591,
595, 34 S.E.2d 828, 832 (1945).
93. Mayor v. Wood, 114 Ga. 370, 40 S.E. 239 (1901) ; Beasley v. Burt, 201 Ga. 144, 153,
39 S.E.2d 51, 58 (1946). But cf. Mayo v. McClung, 83 Ga. App. 548, 64 S.E.2d 330

(1951).
94. 207 Ga. 291, 61 S.E.2d 410 (1950). Example of authentication of a writing: Notis
v. State, 84 Ga. App. 199, 65 S.E.2d 622 (1951).
95. 207 Ga. 274, 61 S.E.2d 113 (1950).
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document exception. This exception rests upon the necessity of relieving
public officials from testifying and the guaranty of reliability found in
public duty. The duty to make the certificate is implied from the fact
that the maker is the custodian of the public record from which the copy
is made. There remains the problem of establishing the genuineness of the
certificate of the bureau chief. It is accompanied by another certificate
signed on behalf of the Secretary of the Navy to the effect that the signature
on the first certificate was that of the person who was chief of the bureau.
But what of the genuineness of the second paper? Here the doctrine of
judicial notice assists the proponent: ". . . the seals of the several departments of the government of the United States .. .shall be judicially recognized without the introduction of proof."96 The second certificate had
imprinted thereon the seal of the Navy Department. One more problem
must be solved-does the Secretary have authority to make a certificate?
No general principle justifies implying a power for him. He is not certifying
a copy as a custodian. However, the act of Congress quoted by the court
seems to authorize, by necessary implication, the making of such certificates as are necessary for authentication. Without discussing all of the foregoing points the Supreme Court held the copy of the chart properly admitted.
When a photograph is offered and objected to because conditions
changed between the time of the occurrence in issue and the time at which
the picture was made, the courts tend to let it in97 if it is shown to be a fair
and truthful representation of the thing or place in question. In American
Mutual Liability Co. v. Duncan,99 one judge dissented on the ground that
the X-ray photograph offered in evidence was authenticated only by hearsay and had no probative value. An award under the Occupational Disease
statute and based on a finding that claimant had silicosis was upheld by
the majority of the court on the theory that there was some evidence to
support the finding of the board. Authentication is of course necessary
also when introducing surveys or plats.' °
The interesting question whether a photostatic copy of a letter made
by a bank for its attorney to use in preparing the suit was admissible under
the Act of February 7, x95 °o1 'as a reproduction made in the regular course
of business to preserve permanently the writing copied, was raised in
96. GA. CODE § 38-112 (1933). The opinion in the Pressley case says the copy is authenticated as provided in 62 STAT. 946 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1733 (Supp. 1951), but the
statute does not say how the copies are to be authenticated and furthermore the
Congress cannot legislate rules of evidence for the Georgia courts except with
reference to "full faith and credit." Edmonds v. State, 201 Ga. 108 (6), 39 S.E.2d
24, 26 (1946). Nor would the federal statute furnish an exception to the "best evidence rule" that would be in effect in Georgia but the copy of the record would be
admissible in lieu of the original under a common law principle similar to GA.
CODE § 38-602 (1933).
97. Sylvania C. Ry. Co. v. Gay, 82 Ga. App. 486, 61 S.E.2d 587 (1950); Bainbridge
v. Cox, 83 Ga. App. 453, 64 S.E.2d 192 (1951).
98. Stembridge v. State, 82 Ga. App. 214, 60 S.E.2d 491 (1950).
99. 83 Ga. App. 863, 65 S.E.2d 59 (1951).
100. Georgia Power Co. v. Green, 207 Ga. 250, 61 S.E.2d 146 (1950) ; Railway Express
Agency, Inc. v. Mathis, 83 Ga. App. 415, 63 S.E.2d 921 (1951).
101. Ga. Laws 1951, § 1, p. 73.
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Williams v. American Surety Co.1"' The court avoided deciding the question by holding that the showing as to the unavailability of the original
satisfied the best evidence rule.
BURDEN OF PROOF

The two meanings of burden of proof are discussed in Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co. v. Thomas.' °3 The view is.expressed in the opinion that the term
should not be used when the burden of producing evidence is meant. The
action was for damages for injuries received when a taxicab in which
plaintiff was riding as a passenger and a train of the defendant railroad
collided at a crossing. The railroad "denied liability" and asserted negligence attributable to its codefendant the taxicab owner as the proximate
cause of the injury. The judge charged the jury in effect that when the
plaintiff established the essential allegations of his petition by a preponderance of the evidence he made out a prima facie case and the burden shifted
to the defendants to make good -their defense. The plaintiff obtained a
verdict against both defendants and the railroad assigned error on the
overruling of its motion for new trial. Held, reversed, the charge was
erroneous.
The court points out that the statutory presumption of negligence resulting from the infliction of injury by the running of the locomotive or
cars of the railroad was changed in 1929.2"4 Because the Supreme Court
of the United States held Section 2780 of the Code of i9io unconstitutional," 5 a new provision was adopted by the General Assembly establishing
a presumption which is rebutted when the railroad introduces opposing
evidence. This presumption shifts the burden of producing evidence, or
the burden of evidence as it is also called, to the defendant railroad when
the injury by the running of the locomotive or train is shown. If the railroad introduces evidence of the due care of its employees tending to disprove the negligence pleaded, the burden of evidence shifts back to the
plaintiff. The burden of proof, in the sense of the burden of persuading
the jury of the truth of his petition, is upon the plaintiff in a case like this
in which no affirmative plea is filed;. 0 this burden does not shift; and since
the pleadings did not place any burden of persuasion on the defendants the
trial judge in his charge should not have required the defendants to "make
good their defense." As emphasized in the opinion, cases decided before
1929 are of no aid in determining the effect of the present presumption
on the burden of proof.
The operation of the burden of evidence in requiring the party to produce sufficient evidence to get past the judge is illustrated by Simpson v.
102. 83 Ga. App. 66, 62 S.E.2d 673 (1950). On best evidence see also Mayo v. McClung,

83 Ga. App. 548, 64 S.E.2d 330 (1951).
103. 83 Ga. App. 477, 64 S.E.2d 301 (1951).
104. Ga. Laws 1929, p. 315, GA. CODE § 94-1108 (1933).
105. Western & A. R. Co. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639, 49 S.Ct. 445, 73 L. Ed. 884 (1929).
106. The burden of proof is upon the defendant to establish the facts pleaded in an
affirmative plea where a prima facie case has been made out for the plaintiff.

Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 82 Ga. App. 136, 60 S.E.2d 547 (1950). Charging
concerning the measure of the burden in criminal cases is treated in Kersey v.
State, 207 Ga. 326, 61 S.E.2d 493 (1950), and Walker v. State, 208 Ga. 99, 65,
S.E.2d 403 (1951).
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State.'07 There a verdict was directed for the plaintiff and the case thus
withdrawn from the jury because the intervening claimants failed to carry
the burden of producing evidence. The State of Georgia brought a proceeding to condemn an automobile which had been used to transport intoxicating liquor in violation of law. The intervenors introduced evidence tending
to prove their ownership of the car and their want of knowledge of the
illegal use to which it was put, but offered no evidence of the registration
of the motor vehicle with the State Motor Vehicle Department in the
true names and addresses of the claimants or their predecessors in title,
nor any evidence of a purchase of the car new within thirty days of the
time of the seizure. Since by statute either (I) registration or (2) a combination of newness and purchase from a dealer within thirty days was
required to make out their claim they failed to carry the burden, and the
direction of the verdict for the State and denial of a new trial was affirmed.
SUMMATION

Each side objected to the argument to the jury made by counsel on the
other side in Osteen v. State.' Three men were jointly indicted for burglary but one of them, Osteen, was tried alone. His attorney sought to
read from the book, Convicting the Innocent, by Borchard which gives an
account of numerous instances in which persons were convicted of crimes
and afterwards shown clearly to be innocent. On objection by the solicitor
general the trial judge ruled out the use of the book saying in part:
While counsel may quote from memory or even read brief extracts of literature, or historical matter to illustrate and make effective a discussion of the
facts nothing which performs the office of evidence or introduces facts calculated
to influence the jury, can first be used in argument. Applying that rule to the
situation with which we are now confronted in the concluding argument by the
defendant, I am disposed to rule that counsel are entirely within their rights in
arguing the fallibility of conviction as circumstantial evidence and the fallibility
of identification testimony. I think that counsel are entirely within their rights
to refer to the fact that there have been cases of conviction of innocent persons
because of the fallibility of that type of evidence. I believe it is outside of the rule
to make reference to specific individual cases giving the general facts of a
specific case where the conviction was wrongful because it seems to me this
is partaking of the nature of stating in the argument facts which are not in this
record and which the state has no opportunity to reply to one way or another. 1° 9

The Court of Appeals approved the trial court's ruling. His ruling on the
defense's objection to the argument of the solicitor general was also approved. One of the coindictees was named Bone. The solicitor said he
was going to get Bone back from Mississippi and "have him up here"
and would prove what Bone told the officers out there in Mississippi about
what transpired in Macon. Defendant's counsel moved for a mistrial. The
motion was overruled, defendant was convicted and denied a new trial,
and the judgment was affirmed. Two judges dissented on the ground that
there was no evidence of Bone having said anything in Mississippi and that
the Code"0 requires the trial judge to rebuke counsel who make statements
of prejudicial matters which are not in evidence. The judge did not offer
107.
108.
109.
110.

82 Ga. App. 319, 60 S.E.2d 537 (1950).
83 Ga. App. 346, 63 S.E.2d 416 (1951).
83 Ga. App. at 349-50, 63 S.E.2d at 418.
GA. CODE § 81-1009 (1933).
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any rebuke in this case. Another criticism might be made of the judge's
handling of the occurrence. He did not make it clear that the solicitorgeneral's argument was objectionable because referring to facts not in
evidence. He merely told the jury that they were not concerned with the
guilt of any person other than the defendant. The jury might very well
have considered the implications of the argument to have a bearing on
the guilt of the defendant on trial. The judge did not clearly tell them
to disregard such implications. The majority of the Court of Appeals misinterpreted the language of the trial judge. The opinion says that he told
the jury to disregard any remarks made by the solicitor which might reflect
on the guilt or innocence of the accused."' If by the accused they mean the
defendant on trial, the judge told the jury just the opposite.
During the trial of Palmer v. Jackson"" the testimony of a witness was
ruled out after being delivered by the witness. At the conclusion of the
evidence of both parties the judge reversed himself and admitted the previously disallowed testimony without having the official stenographer read
it to the jury. On appeal it was held not to be error to overrule the special
ground of the motion for new trial based on such ruling. It may be remarked
that here is a situation in which counsel could use his summation of the
evidence to clear up any confusion on the part of the jury. If counsel is not
just looking for some reversible error after losing the case but really feels
during the trial that the jury may have complied with the first ruling of
the trial court and put the evidence out of their minds, he can assist them
to recall it by giving a full resume in his argument. This suggestion assumes, of course, that the particular testimony was not too long to be
handled by counsel in the time available.
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

The latest manifestation of a long continued course of persistent error
is found in Chester v. State."' The case holds that the corpus delicti
cannot be proved by a confession alone but must be shown by other
evidence. The Court of Appeals evidently believed the proposition to be
so well established that the citation of authority was unnecessary. Many
cases could have been cited but none in accord with the present one was
decided prior to 1903. Actually the law of Georgia is contra as shown by
controlling decisions handed down before 19o3. The Code in what is now
Section 38-420 provides: ".

.

. A confession alone, uncorroborated by any

other evidence, shall not justify a conviction." Since the Code does not say
in what particulars the confession is to be corroborated it was decided at
an early date that the sufficiency or insufficiency would be left to the
jury." 4 This rule continued to be recognized for many years, the only
reference to corpus delicti being statements that proof of it would be
sufficient to corroborate." 5 Recognizing proof of the corpus delicti as one
method of corroborating a confession, and requiring such proof in every
case as the only legal method of corroboration are obviously quite differ111. 83 Ga. App. at 349, 63 S.E.2d at 418.
112.
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ent. Nevertheless in 1903 the Supreme Court, without citing any of the
decisions representing the other view, held that a confession did not support a conviction unless it was corroborated by evidence of the corpus
delicti."5 The only Georgia case cited to support this conclusion does not
so hold. It decides that the conviction being reviewed could not stand because there was no corroboration of any kind." 7 The opinion contains some
loose expressions which the 1903 case seizes upon but the same judge who
used those expressions in 1871 made his stand clear a year later when,
after quoting the Code and stating that the Supreme Court did not feel
authorized to draw any line as to what is required for corroboration, he
said:
Each case must stand upon its own footing, the jury being the judges. And
if they convict on a confession which is corroborated by only one circumstance
the rule is complied with; . . ."I

This I872 case being prior to those adopting the other view and never
having been overruled is controlling. At least such is true in theory. What
the chances are of getting the courts to return to the true doctrine after
almost fifty years of heresy is a matter of speculation. Apparently the prosecuting attorneys have not tried very hard to have the 1872 decision
followed as it seems not to have been cited in recent years.
But this is not the entire story of Chester v. State. The cases which
during the past forty-eight years have required corroboration by proof
of the corpus delicti have held or assumed that such proof was complete
when it showed the commission of the crime charged even though it did
not show who the perpetrator was."' The case under discussion requires in
addition a showing, aside from the confession, of the commission of the
crime by the accused. The opinion does not say what crime was involved
in the charge against the defendant. It may be inferred that the crime was
operating an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
The opinion calls the evidence insufficient to sustain the verdict and continues:
This is true for the reason that there is no evidence whatsoever in the instant
case to prove that the defendant was operating the car at the time and place in
question. This essential element of the crime for which the defendant was120 tried
was supplied only by proof of a confession on the part of the defendant.

Since the confession is evidence the quotation appears to be contradictory.
It probably means that there was no evidence other than the confession. If
there was no other evidence of any drunken driving during the particular
night in the place charged the result is in accord with the line of Georgia
decisions beginning in 1903. But if the language of the opinion is to be
taken literally, an additional requirement as to corroborating evidence
is placed upon any prosecution relying on a confession. It is hoped that the
language can be explained away and that we are not getting any further
away from sound doctrine. If every element of the confession must be
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corroborated, a confession can never be anything but cumulative evidence.
Corroboration looms large among the sub-topics under the subject of
sufficiency. During the period there were decisions on corroborating ac22 in addition to those on -the problem
complices12 ' and rape complainants
23
of corroborating confessions.
In one case 1'1 the court attaches importance to the presence or absence
of continuity in the possession of alcoholic beverages where the issue is
as to guilt of selling such beverages. One of the weaknesses in the prosecution's contentions was the fact that defendant was shown to have had
possession of large quantities on only one occasion and defendant offered
as an explanation his wife's alleged plan to have a family party. The
situation was contrasted by the court with the facts of prior decisions in
which possesion of large quantities was shown over a period of time. In
another case the court upheld a conviction based on a very weak set of
circumstances.'25 The precedent relied on in the opinion is obviously distinguishable by the short time between the crime and the apprehension of
the accused, the direction the stolen car was traveling, and the circumstance
that the fellow suspect driving the car did not testify for the defendant.
The court ignored the dogma that to warrant a conviction circumstantial
evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of
the accused.' An interesting but hardly debatable decision was to the
effect that "newly discovered" evidence was not a sufficient ground for a
new-trial when the additional testimony just discovered was to be given
by a person who was a witness for the State and was not cross-examined by
the accused." 7
DEPOSITIONS

The ruling in Bell v. Jashain"'is that failure to object to certain questions in interrogatories sooner did not bar party from objecting at trial
upon substantial grounds relating to the incompetency of such testimony.
Hogg v. First Nat. Bank"' contains a holding that failure to allow plaintiff to read a deposition was not harmful to plaintiff because witness was
in court, was put on stand by plaintiff, and parts of deposition were
121.
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allowed to be used to show entrapment and to impeach him, and the
judge later ruled that the jury could consider the deposition for all purposes. However, the entire deposition was not read to the jury. The
opinion does not say how the deposition was taken. Presumably it was
taken under Code Section 38-2301 ; otherwise there would be no necessity
to consider whether plaintiff was harmed. The refusal to allow the reading
of a deposition taken under Section 38-2201 or by interrogatories under
38-2101 would be justified by Sections 38-22o5 and 38-2103 since the
witness was in court at the time of the trial."' The last two sections provide that if the ground for taking the deposition ceases to exist before
trial the deposition shall not be used. In Royals v. Statc T the rule that
depositions are to be read to the jury and not allowed to be taken to the
jury room was used to support by analogy the conclusion that permitting
jury to have statements signed by defendant and by alleged co-conspirator
respectively and to take them to the jury room and keep them in their
possession during their deliberations constituted ground for new trial. The
statements were introduced by the State and delivered to the jury over
the objection of the defendant. The court indicates that the writings which
are not to go out with the jury are those which depend for their value
entirely upon the credibility of the maker. The reason is that the jury
might read and reread the documents so as to have them speak more than
once.
CONCLUSION

Although a number of interesting decisions were rendered by the appellate courts of Georgia on the subject of evidence during the period of
this study, the cases do not make any important changes in the law. The
only significant developments were the result of statutes dealing with
competency and privileges of witnesses.
130. Western & Atlantic R. Co. v. Bussey, 95 Ga. 584, 23 S.E. 207 (1894).
131. 208 Ga. 78, 65 S.E.2d 158 (1951).

